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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS RECOVERABLE 
ON THE EXISTENCE OF A QUASI CONTRACT 
Great Lakes Chemical Co. maintained its home office in Arkansas. 
Its truck, loaded with cylinders of methyl bromide, was involved in an 
accident in Florida as a result of which the deadly gas began to escape. 
Louis Tipper, an expert in the handling of deadly gases, was asked by 
the local police chief to help in the clean-up operation. After taking part 
in the operation, claimant noticed he had chemical burns on his feet. He 
was subsequently hospitalized for over three weeks and totally disabled 
for four months. Tipper instituted a claim for workmen's compensation 
against Great Lakes Chemical Co. The Judge of Industrial Claims 
ruled that the chief of police had the authority to engage Tipper on be-
half of Great Lakes Chemical Co. and that an implied contract of em-
ployment existed between Tipper and Great Lakes Chemical Co. On re-
view, the Industrial Relations Commission reversed. The Supreme Court 
of Florida, on certiorari review, held, reversed: There was an implied 
contract of employment between Tipper and the company for workmen's 
compensation purposes. Tipper v. Great Lakes Chemical Co., 281 So. 2d 
10 (Fla. 1973). 
Workmen's compensation claims are governed by Florida Statutes, 
section 440 ( 1971). To qualify for benefits it is essential that one can be an 
employee under a contract, either express or implied.1 Tipper is the first 
case in Florida to find an employer-employee relationship under a con-
tract implied in law, a "quasi contract."2 
The Supreme Court of Florida has usually applied a liberal construc-
tion to the workmen's compensation statute3 because "the workmen's com-
pensation law was intended to provide a direct, informal and inexpensive 
method of relieving society of the burden of caring for injured workmen 
and to place the responsibility on the industry served."4 Indeed, the act 
itself provides for such a broad interpretation.11 
1. "Employee" means every person engaged in any employment under any appoint-
ment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, including 
aliens, and also including minors whether lawfully or unlawfully employed. FLA. STAT. 
§ 440.02(2) (a) (1971). 
2. A concise statement of the principle of quasi contracts is found in the Restatement of 
Restitution. 
A person who without mistake, coercion or request has unconditionally conferred a 
benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution, except where the benefit was 
conferred under circumstances making such action necessary for the protection of 
the interest of the other person or of third persons. 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF REsTITUTION § 112 (1937). 
3. See Thomas Smith Farms, Inc. v. Alday, 182 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1966); City of Hialeah 
v. Warner, 128 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1961); Cook v. Georgia Grocery, Inc., 125 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 
1960) ; Alexander v. Peoples Ice Co., 85 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1955) ; Townsley v. Miami Roofing 
and Sheet Metal Co., 79 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1955). 
4. Port Everglades Terminal Co. v. Canty, 120 So. 2d 596, 602 (Fla. 1960). 
5. In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this 
chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary: 
(1) That the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter. (2) That sufficient 
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The court has generally held that the test of an employer-employee 
relationship should be the same as that which existed at common law for 
finding vicarious liability.6 At common law there were four basic elements 
which were considered in determining whether such a relationship existed; 
selection and engagement of the services, payment of wages, power of 
dismissal, and power of control.7 The cases have agreed that the most 
important of these elements is the right to control the conduct of the em-
ployee. 8 
The scope of the Florida workmen's compensation statute is, in one 
respect, narrower than the common law definition of an "employee." The 
statute requires the existence of an express or implied employment con-
tract.9 This was emphasized in Leon County v. Sauls,1° which stated that 
if one is to recover under the workmen's compensation statute "there must 
exist a contractual relationship between employer and employee grounded 
on consideration passing from one to another."11 In Sauls the claimant, 
whose husband was killed while assisting a police officer in the apprehen-
sion of a suspect, was denied recovery because the "deceased had no con-
tractual relationship with the county.m2 
The first workmen's compensation case in Florida which found an 
implied contract for hire was Stuyvesant Corp. v. Waterhouse.13 Although 
the court held that such a contract existed, it was one implied in fact, not 
in law.14 The court stated: 
There is no doubt that the compensation act contemplates that 
it would be necessary in many instances to determine the em-
ployer-employee relationship from facts and circumstances as 
distinguished from formal contract of employment because of 
the use of the word 'implied' in the act itself.15 
notice of such claim has been given. (3) That the injury was not occasioned pri-
marily by the intoxication of the injured employee. ( 4) That the injury was not oc-
casioned by the wilful intention of the injured employee to injure or kill himself or 
another. 
FLA. STAT. § 440.26 (1971). 
6. See, e.g., Gentile Bros. Co. v. Florida Indus. Comm., 10 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1942). 
7. 53 AM. JUR. 2d Master and Servant § 2 (1970). 
8. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Gray Decorators, Inc., 166 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1964); Patton 
Seafood Co. v. Glisson, 38 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1949). 
9. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(2)(a) (1971). 
10. 151 Fla. 171, 9 So. 2d 461 (1942) [hereinafter referred to as Sauls]. 
11. Id. at 463. 
12. Id. 
13. 74 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1954). 
14. Contracts implied in fact are inferred from the facts and circumstances of the 
case, and are not formally or explicitly stated in words. It is often said that the 
only difference between an express contract and a contract implied in fact is that in 
the former the parties arrive at their agreement by words, whether oral or written, 
while in the latter their agreement is arrived at by a consideration of their acts and 
conduct and that in both of these cases there is, in fact, a contract existing between 
the parties, the only difference being in the character of evidence necessary to estab-
lish it. 
17 AM.. ]UR. 2d Contract§ 3 (1964). 
15. Stuyvesant Corp. v. Waterhouse, 74 So. 2d 554, 559 (Fla. 1954). 
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The difference between a contract implied in fact and one implied in law 
is that the former requires a manifested intent to enter into an agreement 
while the latter is an obligation imposed by law on grounds of justice and 
equity. 
The court in Tipper was forced to look to other jurisdictions for sup-
porting case law dealing with quasi contractual employment in the area of 
workmen's compensation.16 The case relied on by the court in Tipper was 
Conveyor's Corp. of America v. Industrial Commission,17 in which an em-
ployee of a certain corporation who went to the rescue of an employee of 
a second corporation on neighboring premises, and was himself killed, 
was held to be the implied employee of the second corporation. Becker, 
an employee of the second corporation, and the only agent of the corpora-
tion present, had secured the assistance of the deceased. The court, by 
first finding a duty of an employer to aid an employee in an emergency,18 
found that Becker "was by necessary implication authorized to procure 
assistance.mo 
The facts in Tipper, made it impossible for the court to squarely rest 
its decision on any of the two premises found in Conveyor's. The well-
being of an employee was not involved, and claimant's assistance was not 
secured by an employee of Great Lakes Chemical Co. The Judge of In-
dustrial Claims, in finding for the claimant, based his opinion on the fol-
lowing grounds: 
(1) As a police officer, in a public emergency, [the chief of po-
lice] had the authority to engage the claimant on behalf of the 
employer; (2) from the facts, an implied contract of employ-
ment was established, which was confirmed the following morn-
ing when Mr. Joe Ford of Great Lakes Chemical Co. was ad-
vised of services rendered by the claimant and told Mr. Tipper 
to see a doctor; 20 ( 3) the services rendered by the claimant were 
beneficial to the employer and advanced his interests.21 
This reasoning was in line with the Conveyor's case. In both decisions a 
third party's implied authority to hire was found. Though not dealing 
with an employer's duty to rescue his employee, the Judge of Industrial 
Claims may have based his conclusion on the common law duty to refrain 
from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others.22 
16. See A. LARSON, LARsoN'S WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 47.42(c) (1973) for 
somewhat similar cases arising in other jurisdictions. 
17. 200 Wis. 512, 228 N.W. 118 (1929) [hereinafter referred to as Conveyor's]. 
18. Id. at 514, 228 N.W. at 120. 
19. For this kind of implied hiring authority to arise there must, of course, be a genuine 
emergency, ruling out normal procedure for hiring or for obtaining permission to engage 
assistance. A. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 47.42(c) (1973). 
20. Mr. Ford, employed as a saftey man with Great Lakes Chemical Co. expressed con-
cern over Tipper's exposure to the toxic gas and suggested that he "see a doctor." 281 So. 2d 
at 12 (explanation added). 
21. Id. 
22. Banfield v. Addington, 104 Fla. 661, 140 So. 893 (1932). 
. --· 
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Upon review, the Industrial Relations Commission "conceded that 
an implied contract of employment was a 'possibility' under certain cir-
cumstances, but that the events ... involving the claimant would not sup-
port such a conclusion as a matter of law."28 The Commission believed 
that the chief of police had no authority to hire the claimant for Great 
Lakes Chemical Company.24 The Commission also stated "that even if 
there were an implied contract of hire, there was no finding that the 
claimant was an 'employee' as distinguished from an 'independent contrac-
tor' ."211 
The Supreme Court of Florida totally disregarded the Commission's 
contention that the claimant was an independent contractor. The court 
felt it was also unnecessary to decide "whether the chief of police ... had 
legal authority to 'hire' the claimant on behalf of Great Lakes."26 The 
court stated that "the important facts of this case concern the claimant's 
performance of services for Great Lakes, and not how he was called to 
action."27 The court simply found that the facts of the case gave rise to a 
contract of hire implied in law. The court stated: 
The claimant was serving the respondent when he risked his life 
and health in order to protect the lives and health of others and 
to restrict the liability of the respondent from further damages 
from the accident. A contract of employment, implied in law, 
arose out of this performance and the claimant is now entitled to 
workmen's compensation.28 
The supreme court further stated that "the result which we reach is dic-
tated by the emergency nature of the events."29 The holding in Tipper 
may, therefore, be limited to emergency situations. 
The court in Tipper by this decision has reasserted the proposition 
that the workmen's compensation statute should be liberally construed. 
The only weakness in the decision is that the court totally disregarded the 
Commission's contention that claimant was an independent contractor. 
Recovery in past cases has often been denied on this basis.80 Whether re-
covery in situations similar to the present case might be denied if the court 
finds a claimant to be an independant contractor must be answered by 
future decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida. In the future the court 
might not concern itself with distinctions of this type by letting the bur-
den for compensation rest where it should, on the industry served. 
DAVID FRISCH 
23. 281 So. 2d at 12. 
24. The Commission seems to have arrived at this decision simply because there was 
no decisional, statutory or textual authority to support such a conclusion. Id. 
25. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP AGENCY § 220(2) (1958). 
26. 281 So. 2d at 14. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 15. 
29. Id. at 14. 
30. See, e.g., Strickland v. Al Landers Dump Trucks, Inc., 170 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1964); 
Baya's Bar & Grill v. Alcorn, 40 So. 2d 468 (1949) • 
